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ARTICLES
MOVING BEYOND STRICT SCRUTINY: THE NEED
FOR A MORE NUANCED STANDARD OF EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS FORK THROUGH 12
INTEGRATION PROGRAMS
Deborah N. Archer·

"The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country
is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from act•
.
. ,,1
mg m response to it.
INTRODUCTION

Throughout several areas of the law the Supreme Court has often
rationalized the restrictions and limitations put on the remedial use
of race by stating that many of the ultimate goals of affirmative action
in higher education and employment are best left to K through 12
3
2
education to achieve. At the same time, federal courts have taken
• Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A., 1993 Smith College; J.D., 1996
Yale Law School. I would like to thank Chinh Le for his invaluable help in the conceptualization and writing of this Article; Andrew Berman, Richard Buery, Elizabeth Chambliss, Kris
Franklin, Seth Harris, Richard Marsico, Dennis Parker, Nadine Strossen, Kele Williams, and
Maja Hazell for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts; Jennifer Addonizio, Natasha Neal,
and Jessica Roth for their invaluable research assistance; and New York Law School for its support through its summer research grant.
' Hampton v.Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 378 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
' K through 12 education refers to kindergarten through the twelfth grade.
3
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (asserting that the Court has
"repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship"); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The inculcation of
[civil] values is truly the work of the schools.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (discussing "the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and cultural heritage"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (recognizing that
public schools teach children "the values on which our society rests"); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan,]., concurring) (referring to "the public
schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government"); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (declaring that education is "the very
foundation of good citizenship"); Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (acknowledging
that "[t]he American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as
matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted"); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 (Parents Involved II), 426 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting that a "desegregated educational experience opens opportunity networks in areas of
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steps to curtail the ability of primary and secondary school boards to
voluntarily craft measures to address racial inequalities and disparities
that continue to plague our public schools fifty years after Brown v.
4
Board of Education declared separate schools unconstitutional. If the
courts are going to defer resolution of the nation's race problems to
our public schools, they cannot simultaneously prevent these schools
from using the tools most directly capable of bringing the nation
closer to achieving the promise of Brown.
Recently in Massachusetts, a federal appellate court applied the
Supreme Court's affirmative action analysis from Grutter v. Bollingd
to strike down a race-conscious K through 12 integration program.
In Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit evaluated a race-conscious integration pro7
gram using the strict scrutiny framework of Grutter. Comfort is part of
a trend of applying strict scrutiny to race-conscious integration programs that has gained new momentum following the decision in Grut-

higher education and employment"); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d
328, 356 (D. Mass. 2003) (reviewing expert testimony that "[i] t is more difficult to" teach racial
tolerance to college-age students; the time to do it is when the students are still young, before
they are locked into racialized thinking"), a.ffd en bane, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
• See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 (Parents Involved I), 377
F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) (enjoining the use of race in a student assignment plan), rev'd en
bane, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3425 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05908); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding
admissions policy that weighed race as distinct factor was unconstitutional because it was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of attaining a diverse student body); Tuttle
v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); Wessmann v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790, 809 (1st Cir. 1998) (striking down admissions program that used race as a factor
in selecting students for a prominent public high school); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub.
Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (holding a school admissions program unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause), a.ffd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. June 5, 2005) (No. 05-915); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch.
Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 633-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding transfer admissions program to an
elementary school unconstitutional because it failed to survive an equal protection challenge),
vacated, 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
' 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6
418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (Comfort Ill).
7
Comfort II involved a challenge to the "Lynn Plan," an integration plan developed by the
school committee in Lynn, Massachusetts. See Comfort II, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48. Under the
Lynn Plan, every student in Lynn is entitled to attend his or her neighborhood school. A student's race is taken into account only when a student seeks to transfer to a school other than his
or her neighborhood school. A minority student may not transfer to a school that is racially
imbalanced and a white student may not transfer to a school that is racially isolated. However,
Lynn allows and encourages all desegregative transfers, which are those transfers which improve
the racial balance of the sending or receiving school. See id. While both programs were ultimately upheld by en bane courts, this vindication came only after years of costly and politically
damaging litigation for the school boards. Furthermore, the original panel decisions and those
of the lower courts in these two cases are more in line with the analysis and outcomes in other
circuits that have struck down race-conscious programs.
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8

ter. Invited by the Supreme Court's seemingly unequivocal language
in Adarand Constructors v. Pena9 that "all racial classifications, imposed
by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be ana10
lyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny," federal district and
appellate courts confronted with the question have generally treated
the equal protection issues raised by voluntary school integration in
the tradition of affirmative action, no matter how they ultimately decide the matter on the merits." While Grutterand its companion case,
12
Gratz v. Bollinger, provided significant guidance on the use of raceconscious admissions policies in higher education, the decision did
not shed light on the applicability of these standards to K through 12
student assignment programs. That affirmative action programs and
race-conscious integration programs both involve education does not
mean they implicate the same rights.
[W]hile racial distinctions are irrelevant to nearly all legitimate state
objectives and are properly subjected to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny in most instances, they are highly relevant to the one legitimate state
objective of eliminating the pernicious vestiges of past discrimination;
13
when that is the goal, a less exacting standard of review is appropriate.

This principle is even more compelling when the state action reviewed is the elimination of segregation among primary and secondary school children.
While many courts have recognized that important differences exist between affirmative action in higher education and employment,
and while race-conscious student assignment programs exist and
must be carefully weighed, 14 the courts have largely treated these as
' See also Parents Involved I, 377 F.3d 949, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying strict scrutiny analysis to race-conscious school integration program); Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist.,
212 F.3d 738, 745 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 129 (same); Tuttle, 195 F.3d at
704 (same).
• 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
10
Id. at 227.
11
See, e.g., Parents Involved I, 377 F.3d at 960 (applying affirmative action analysis to raceconscious integration program); Brewer, 212 F.3d at 745 (same); Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707 (same);
Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Wessmann
v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809 (1st Cir. 1998) (same); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch.,
330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (same).
12
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
" Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan,]., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
14
See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1992) (noting that remedies used in
public schools such as pupil assignments, busing, quotas, and zoning are unavailable when people freely choose to pursue an advanced education); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II),
283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 369 (D. Mass. 2003) (advocating a "fact-sensitive inquiry"). The court in
Comfort //went as far as stating its disagreement with the application of strict scrutiny. Id. at 366;
see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1960) ("[I]n dealing with claims under
broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by an interpretive process of inclu-
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differences in degree, not differences in kind. The courts have also
largely ignored that the acceptable approach in affirmative action
cases is simply not feasible for a local school district. This term, the
United States Supreme Court will review the cases of McFarland v. jef
15
ferson County Public Schools and Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
6
Seat{le School District, No. J1 to determine whether voluntary integration efforts by school districts should be viewed in the light of affirmative action and subjected to strict scrutiny.
Rather than conceding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate constitutional standard when dealing with public primary and secondary
schools, this Article endeavors to begin the jurisprudential inquiry
anew and concludes that voluntary school integration does not
emerge out of the historical or legal fabric of affirmative action in
higher education or employment, nor does it analytically fit in the
mold there created. Accordingly, courts should not import wholesale
the standards of the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence into the K through 12 arena.
Part I of this Article explores the implications of the judiciary placing increasing responsibility for addressing the legacy of segregation
in the hands of local school boards, while simultaneously making it
increasingly difficult for school boards to address these inequalities
through non-merit-based, race-conscious student assignment poli17
cies. Part II examines Brown and its progeny as the point of departure in determining the applicable standard for K through 12 integration programs. Finally, Part III of this Article concludes that
courts should view voluntary school integration as an extension of the
Court's school desegregation jurisprudence rather than the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence. This makes sense not only historically, but analytically as well. Supreme Court cases finding no harm
from integrative student assignments are analytically inconsistent with
affirmative action rulings. In affirmative action cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires courts to consider the harm done to a white
student who has been denied admission to an institution of higher

sion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on and qualified by the concrete
situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of context in disregard of variant controlling facts."); Wessman v. Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120, 128 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[The]
unique mission of public secondary schools distinguishes them from other governmental bodies
that have instituted race-conscious policies, including other educational institutions such as colleges and graduate schools.").
15
416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05915).
16
426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3425 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05908).
17
This Article focuses on race-conscious programs as opposed to what has commonly been
referred to as race-preference programs. Race-conscious student assignment plans are those
where, although race is considered, the plan ultimately impacts all races equally.
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education. Those same considerations are not triggered, however,
when school districts delicately manage the assignment of K through
12. students in largely fungible public schools for pedagogical purposes.18 Relieving school districts that engage in voluntary integration
efforts from having to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard would also
have important and valuable practical implications, as the Grntter
paradigm fails to acknowledge and give due weight to the myriad
considerations that school districts must balance as they formulate
and implement effective student assignment policies. 19
I. lNCOMPATIBILilY OF STRICT SCRUTINY AND INTEGRATION PROGRAMS

A. A Historical Perspective

Since the Court pronounced that "[s]eparate educational facilities
20
are inherently unequal" in Brown, "the nation has struggled, often
against great resistance and with mixed results, to rid itself of the
scourge of segregation and its effects."21 Following the Court's decision in Brown, local school boards resorted to subtle and creative
22
measures to avoid the Brown mandate. Many lawsuits were initiated
to try to realize the promise of Brown, but to mixed results. 23
18

See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
"' Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
21
Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in Elementary
and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from Recent judicial Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 63, 64 (2002).
" See, e.g., Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (describing how a school board, in
response to a desegregation order, closed its public schools and opened a private school for
whites); Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) (noting that a
school board changed public schools to private schools in order to avoid desegregation); see al.so
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 344 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding that "the School Board had applied its energies for decades in an
effort to 'limit or evade' its obligation to desegregate the parish schools").
" See generally Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that a multidistrict remedy
for single-district de jure segregation was improper in the absence of findings that the other
included districts had failed to operate unitary school systems or had committed acts that effected segregation); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (holding that a finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions in a school system created a prima facie case of
unlawful segregated design on part of school authorities and shifted to those authorities the
burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system were not the result of intentionally segregative actions); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(holding that where a dual school system had been maintained and school board had defaulted
in its duty to come forward with acceptable plan of its own, limited use of mathematical ratios of
white to black students, pairing of noncontiguous school zones, and a system of a bus transportation were all permissible tools within the power of the district court); Green v. County Sch.
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that a freedom of choice plan in which not a single white
child had chosen to attend a former black public school and eighty-five percent of black children in system still attended that school did not constitute adequate compliance with school
19
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The disappointing history of school desegregation after the Brown
decision has been ably recounted by many others. 24 The vast majority
of post-Brown Supreme Court school desegregation cases have dealt
with the constitutional obligations of former de jure segregated
school systems and the authorit)' of federal courts to order remedies. 25
26
In Green v. County School Board, the Supreme Court mandated that
school boards had "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might
be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." 27 The Court further ordered that school boards must craft desegregation plans "that promise[] realistically to work, and promise[] realistically to work now." 28
By the 1970s, local school boards resigned to protecting segregation
were running out of creative measures to combat desegregation.
White parents took matters into their own hands and many fled the
cities for nearby suburbs, leaving inner-city school districts without
sufficient numbers of white students to craft effective intra-district de29
segregation plans. Federal courts, emboldened by the mandates of
Brown and its implementing cases, issued desegregation orders that
included white suburban school districts in the remedy. 30 By the midto late 1970s, the Court began to question the permissible scope,
reach, and limitations of the remedies that were sought, thus revising
the methods that lower courts employed in crafting their desegrega.
l
31
t10n
pans.

board's responsibility to achieve a system of determining admission to public schools on nonracial basis); Griffin, 377 U.S. 218 (holding that action of the school board in closing the public
schools while contributing to the support of private segregated white schools that took their
place violated the Equal Protection Clause); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that
school board stood as agent of state and that their good faith would not constitute legal excuse
for delay in implementing plan for desegregating schools).
" See, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, R.ace jurispru<l£nce and the Supreme Court: R'here Do We Go
from Here? Dignity in R.ace jurisprud£nce, 7 U. PA.]. CONST. L. 669 (2005) (surveying Supreme
Court decisions from Brown to Grutter); Colin S. Diver, From Equality to Diversity: The Detour from
Brown to Grutter, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (same).
" See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211-12 (finding non-southern school districts with raciallysegregative policies constitutionally liable); Swann, 402 U.S. at 29-30 (ordering transportation
of students to achieve desegregation); Green, 391 U.S. at 439-42 (requiring school systems to
take race into account in order to eliminate vestiges of prior segregation).
26
391 U.S. at 430.
27
Id. at 437-38.
" Id. at 439.
29
David I. Levine, Public School Assignment Methods After Grutter and Gratz: The View from San
Francisco, 30 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 520 {2003).
"' Id. at 521.
" See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 437-39 (1976) (finding that
the district court exceeded its remedial authority in requiring annual readjustment of school
attendance zones if schools became racially isolated); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745-48
(1974) (concluding that an interdistrict desegregation remedy was not permissible without an
initial finding of interdistrict liability).
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In the 1980s and 1990s, federal courts began routinely releasing
these formerly de jure segregated school districts from their obliga32
tions under desegregation orders. In Missouri v. Jenkins, 33 Freeman v.
34
35
36
Pitts, Board of Education v. Dowell, and Green, the Supreme Court
turned its attention to the task of establishing standards for the release of school districts from court SUf>eIVision altogether, returning
control to local school administrators. 37 In the wake of these cases,
numerous school districts each year have returned to federal court
seeking unitary status, 38 and all but a nominal few have been denied. 39
Although Brown got off to a rocky start, it has caused major transformations in our nation's public education system. Since the early
1970s, while white students' achievement has remained constant, the
achievement level of black students, particularly in earlier grades, has
increased. 40 Nevertheless, wide disparities remain. The average stu-

" See Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 324-25 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a school system achieved unitary status); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of
Educ., 246 F.3d 1073, 1074-78 (7th Cir. 2001) (terminating school desegregation decree since
consequences of segregation had been eliminated); Lisa J. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter:
Ensuring Diversity in K-12 Schools, 52 UCLA L. REV. 563, 566 (2004) (discussing how courts have
increasingly released school districts from desegregation orders).
" 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
" 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
" 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
" 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
" See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) ("A series of Court decisions in the 1990s accelerated school
districts' efforts to seek unitary status as well as signaled the Court's desire to disengage with
decades of court supervision of school desegregation activities."); see also Jenkins, 515 U.S. at
101-02 (stating that the elimination of racial .disparities is not required for granting unitary
status unless plaintiffs can trace disparities directly to prior segregation); Freeman, 503 U.S. at
492-93 (noting that supervision may be withdrawn for individual Green factors despite existence
of racial disparities so long as district complied with court order for a reasonable time); Dowel~
498 U.S. at 248 (asserting that supervision of federal courts is intended as a temporary remedy
and that return of local control is the fundamental end-goal of school desegregation litigation).
,. Desegregation orders must be dissolved if the school district has complied in good faith
with the order and the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable. Dowel~ 498 U.S. at 249.
"' See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District
Court judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1633 (2003) (citing a ten-year study of federal district and
appellate court rulings demonstrating that every request for unitary status made was granted,
save one in which the court ordered partial unitary status under Freeman). Moreover, education
expert Gary Orfield has argued that school districts have too quickly moved to receive a declaration of unitary status, and federal courts have moved too quickly to grant their requests. See
Gary Orfield, Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW AND SCHOOL
REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 39 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).
"' Suzanne E. Eckes, How Will the Grutter and Gratz Affirmative Action Decisions Impact K-12
Diversity Plans?, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Meyer Weinberg, The Relationship Between
School Desegregation and Academic Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PRO BS.
241 (1975).
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dent attends a racially segregated school, 41 the average black student
attends a school that is sixty-seven percent black, and the average
42
white student attends a school that is eighty percent white. In fact,
there is a trend towards resegregation. "As courts across the country
end long-running desegregation plans and, in some states, have forbidden the use of any racially-conscious student assignment plans, the
last ten to fifteen years have seen a steady unraveling of almost
twenty-five years worth of increased integration. "43
"Recognizing the social and academic benefits of racially integrated schools, many districts have implemented voluntary raceconscious assignment policies" following release from desegregation
44
orders. Other school districts, either fearing litigation or independently seeking to redress entrenched and evident racial inequalities,
have voluntarily implemented race-conscious student assignment
45
programs and integration plans. Courts have been reluctant to uphold these voluntary efforts by school districts to avoid the pernicious
effects of de facto segregation. Before and after Grutter, courts have
consistently applied strict scrutiny analysis, developed in the context
of higher education admissions and government contracting and
46
employment, to analyze and frequently strike down such programs.
The lower courts in these cases acknowledged the fact that the Supreme Court had yet to hear a case that considered the limits of public school officials' ability to voluntarily consider race in student selec-

" Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Justice in the New Millennium; From Brown to Grutter: Methods to
Achieve Non-Discrimination and Comparable Racial Equality, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 243, 244
(2004).
"Jacqueline Jordan Irvine, Still Standing in the Schoolhouse Door, 23 EDUC. WK. 38, May 19,
2004, available at http:/ /www.teachermag.net/ ewI ewstory.cfm?slug=37Irvine.h23.
" See ERIKA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, RACE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS 4
(2002), http:/ /www.civilrightsproject.haivard.edu/ research/ deseg/Race_in_American_Public_
Schoolsl.pdf.
44
Holmes, supra note 32, at 566.
45
Voluntary integration programs are those that school boards adopt absent court order or
judicial inteivention.
46
Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2005) (striking down program
because school board failed to offer a compelling governmental interest and did not consider
race-neutral alternatives); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 129 (4th
Cir. 1999) (noting that "any racial classification, including that present here, must survive strict
scrutiny review"); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 704 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Adarand and holding that "[a] II racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny" in striking
Arlington's voluntary transfer program). The programs in Comfort II and Parents Involved II were
struck down by the district courts and original courts of appeal panels. But, both programs
were recently upheld by en bane review by the courts of appeals after years of litigation. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 (Parents Involved II), 426 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2005); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 356 (D. Mass. 2003),
ajfd en bane, Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort III), 418 F.3d l (!st Cir. 2005).
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47

tion and turned to the Supreme Court's affirmative action precedents for guidance. The opinions in these cases assumed, without
48
deciding, that diversity was a compelling justification, but several
courts concluded that race-conscious student assignment policies are
49
not narrowly tailored to achieving that goal. With the decision in
Grutter, courts have found what they believe is an appropriate and
uniform framework to assess the constitutionality of these voluntary
plans.
B. Grutter v. Bollinger and the Supreme Court's Affirmative Action
Narrow-Tailoring Analysis

In Grutter, the Supreme Court heard a challenge by applicants to
50
the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program.
The petitioner alleged that the law school's race-conscious admissions
policy violated her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
51
Amendment.
Relying on its affirmative action jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the law school's program
and held that the University of Michigan Law School had a compelling interest in "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
52
diverse student body."
In the process, the Supreme Court developed a framework for analyzing race-conscious admissions programs.
Under this analytic framework, a court must engage in a four-part inquiry to determine if the use of race is narrowly tailored. First, the
use of race must not "insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with other applicants"
53
solely because of race. In essence, the program must allow for individualized review of each applicant. Second, the institution must
54
consider workable, race-neutral alternatives. Third, the use of race

47
See Tutt/,e, 195 F.3d at 705 (noting the unanswered question of whether diversity is a compelling governmental interest in elementary and secondary education).
" See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 345 n.15 (4th Cir.
2001) ("Assuming without deciding whether diversity may be a compelling state interest .... ");
Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130 (same); Tutt/,e, 195 F.3d at 704 (same); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d
790, 795 (1st Cir. 1998) (same).
" Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 123; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705. But see Doe v. Kamehameha Sch., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (D. Haw. 2003) (holding that admissions policy granting preference to
children of Native Hawaiian ancestry constituted valid race-conscious remedial affirmative action program). See generally Mead, supra note 21, at 113 (summarizing the Supreme Court's application of the strict scrutiny standard to race-conscious student selection programs).
50
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003).
51
Id. at 317. The petitioner also alleged a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id.
52
Id. at 328.
" Id. at 334 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) ).
" Id. at 339.
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must not "unduly harm ~e.mbe.rs ~f an4 racial group." And, fourth,
the use of race must be hm1ted m time:
Navigating the Grutter framework may prove too difficult for public secondary and elementary schools. Public school systems that
have voluntarily chosen to consider race in student assignments will
likely encounter little difficulty articulating a compelling interest after Grutter, but may fall short of achieving their integration goals under the weight of narrow tailoring. What the Supreme Court has said
to be the constitutionally accepted approach for the use of race in affirmative action programs is simply not feasible for a school district
that must assi~n thousands of students across multiple schools in a
given district.
Indeed, school boards with limited financial resources are unlikely to devote substantial sums to lure individuals to
conduct individualized reviews of "admissions" or transfer applications to elementary and secondary public schools. 58 "And it borders
on the absurd to imagine these hypothetical phalanxes of public
school admissions officers purporting to conduct searching, individualized 'holistic reviews' of detailed files of millions of four-year-olds
59
applying to kindergartens across the country." And, although some
school boards may ultimately be able to successfully defend their
programs in court, most .will likely choose to abandon their raceconscious programs to avoid lengthy litigation, which even if ultimately successful, can be time-consuming, expensive, and politically
60
divisive. Tying the hands of school districts in this way threatens to
61
undo the progress made since Brown.

55

Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
57
See generally Levine, supra note 29, at 520-21 (arguing that given practical and financial
constraints, public schools most likely will continue to employ "mechanical and routinized"
methods).
58
See id. at 520-21 (noting that in light of the type of individualized review approved in Grutter, the University of Michigan has had to hire additional application reviewers and counselors
at a cost of almost $2 million).
59
Id. at52L
60
See id. Comfort is an excellent example of the quandary faced by school boards seeking to
combat segregation. In light of a challenge, the school board chose to defend its limited transfer program. Although ultimately successful in its defense, the victory came only after six years
of litigation through the federal court system. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort Ill), 418
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005).
61
See GARY 0RFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF BROWNV. BOARD OFE!JUCATION 108 (1996) (describing the public perception towards Brawn at
the time it was decided and towards the desegregation methods, such as busing, used to enforce
Brown). This does not mean that school districts should be given unfettered discretion in their
use of race in student assignment decisions. Indeed, in light of the entrenchment and creativity
to avoid the mandate of Brawn shown by many school districts, some meaningful review should
be applied to assess the validity of the use of race. That review need not be strict scrutiny. See
Jacobson v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying intermediate
scrutiny); Kromnick v. Sch. Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 902-03 (3d Cir. 1984) (same).
56
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II. VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: Two
DISTINCT LINES OF JURISPRUDENCE

The question of the constitutionalicy of voluntary efforts to
achieve racial integration in public schools must be viewed in the
proper context. While certainly a cousin to it, voluntary school integration does not emerge out of the legal fabric of affirmative action
in higher education, public employment, or government contracting.
Rather, it is a milestone along the long and difficult road down which
this nation has traveled over the past fifty years in its quest to achieve
the promise of Brown. The Supreme Court's cases applying strict
scrutiny to race-conscious affirmative action policies dealt not with
the constitutional viability of integrative, race-conscious public school
student assignments, but instead with policies and programs that considered race among other factors in the distribution of what the
62
Court deemed to be legally cognizable burdens and benefits. Brown
and its progeny, therefore, provide the most appropriate point of departure to determine the applicable standards for K-12 voluntary efforts, not cases like Adarand or even Grutter.
In Brown, the Court famously and emphatically declared that "in
the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has
63
no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Having determined that segregated schools violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court then ordered, one year later, that dual systems of education across the United States be dismantled "with all deliberate speed." 64 Opponents of voluntary school integration, and of
affirmative action, often cite Brown to support the claim that race max
never be considered in the assignment of students to public schools. "
Brown dealt with the specific question of whether race, when used for
the purpose of segregating children, was constitutionally permissible. 6
Nothing in the Court's brief opinion indicates that raceconscious assignments for the purpose of furthering integration would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 Indeed, if anything, the Supreme Court's language suggests just the opposite conclusion-that
voluntary efforts to further racial integration would benefit students

62

See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1994) (relating to the hiring of minority business enterprises as subcontractors).
"' Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
64
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
65
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (citing Brown to
support the proposition that giving preference because of race was discrimination).
6
"
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
67
See Owen Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 564, 577-79 (1965) (arguing that a school board is constitutionally permitted to take actions to further racial integration).
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regardless of whether the alternative segregation is de jure or de
68
facto.
A . . Voluntary Efforts Are Well Within the Authority of Local School Officials

In its school desegregation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
expressed the importance of deference to school boards in crafting
69
educational policies. In Brown II, the Court expressed hesitation in
imposing remedies upon formerly de jure school systems without first
allowing the local governing bodies-through the J>olitical process7
time to cure the constitutional ills on their own. Over time, however, the Court's patience with local school authorities waned, as virtually no advancement in desegregation was made in the decade that
followed Brown. 71 Despite its frustration with the perennial failure of
local school authorities to take the measures necessary to desegregate
their schools, the Court continued to afford deference to local school
administrators in taking the first swipe at desegregation before fed. 72
era1 courts steppe d m.
It was not long after the Court approved broad judicial remedies
to de jure segregation in Swann that it began the process of refocusing the goal of desegregation litigation from an unequivocal mandate
in Green to eliminate the vestiges of past segregation "root and
73
branch," to the alternative "end purpose ... to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in
74
compliance with the Constitution." The Supreme Court laid down a

08
See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S at 494-95 (noting that racial segregation in grade and high
schools, even more than segregation in institutions of higher education, has negative effects on
children "that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone"); id. at
494 ("Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the laur, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group." (emphasis
added)).
69
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) ("As we have long observed, 'local autonomy of school districts is a vital natural tradition.'" (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977))); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools;
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process.").
0
'
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown/I), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
71
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) (noting that "very
little progress" had been made between the Court's decisions in Brown and Green); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (expressing vexation with one school board's recalcitrance and demanding that it implement a working plan immediately).
" See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16 (recognizing that school authorities have broad authority to
formulate educational policy).
" Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486 (1992) (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38).
14
Id. at 489.
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75

foundation for this goal in Milliken and San Antonio School District v.
76
Rodrif5Uez, expounded upon it in cases including Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman," and then finally identified it as the "ultimate objective" of school desegregation in its 1990s trilogy of school desegre78
gation cases. In a series of sharply divided decisions in Missouri v.
79
80
81
jenkins, Freeman v. Pitts, and Board of Education v. Dowell, the Supreme Court turned its attention to the task of establishing standards
for the release of school districts from court supervision, returning
82
control to local school administrators. The Supreme Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence continued to express the need for deference to school boards as they crafted educational policies. 83
These cases implicate several rationales for preservation of local
control. First, they acknowledge the value of allowing the political
process to determine how the needs of individual children within
84
each school district are best met.
Furthermore, local control also
serves to encourage "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy

75

Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 (extolling the virtues of local control of educational programs).
76
411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) {stating that local control of educational programs encourages citizen participation, enhances competition, and addresses local needs).
77
433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) ("[T]he case for displacement of the local authorities by a federal court in a school desegregation case must be satisfactorily established by factual proof and
justified by a reasoned statement of legal principles.").
78
See Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (Thomas,]., concurring) ("[L]ocal autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition." (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977))); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 ("As we have long observed, 'local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.'" (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ., 433 U.S. at
410)); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) ("'[N]ecessary concern for the important values of local control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's regulatory
control of such systems not extend beyond the time required to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination.'" (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239,
1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy,]., concurring))).
"' 515 U.S. 70.
'° 503 U.S. 467.
" 498 U.S. 237.
82
See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 (holding that elimination of racial disparities was not required
for granting unitary status unless plaintiffs can trace disparities directly to prior segregation);
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489-90 (noting that supervision may be withdrawn for individual Green factors despite existence of racial disparities so long as district complied with court order for a reasonable time); Dowel~ 498 U.S. at 248 (concluding that supervision of federal courts is intended
as a temporary remedy, and return of local control is a fundamental end-goal of school desegregation litigation).
" See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
84
See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 ("When the school district and all state entities participating with it in operating the schools make decisions in the absence of judicial supervision, they
can be held accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary course."); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 ("Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in the decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit
local needs.").
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competition for educational excellence," 85 and public confidence in
86
the school system generally.
Frequently, the Court has acknowledged the value of local control because of its view that federal judges
should not make pedagogical decisions within the purview of educa87
tors and school boards. Notably, based on this theory of local control, the Supreme Court in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins paved the way
for findings of unitary status desgite its recognition of large racial
disparities in each of those cases. Similarly, the Court invoked the
specter of local control in Milliken to strike down a remedial plan that
would have denied whites a safe haven from integration by fleeing to
89
the suburbs. The elevation of the tradition of local control in the
context of public schools, therefore, in combination with the expression of hope that communities rather than judges are the best
sources of sound, equitable policies, has served over the years to hold
courts at bay even when plaintiffs challenged seemingly dubious education decisions with undisputed evidence of their racially disparate
results. It would be ironic if the importance of local control could be
invoked to insulate school officials from any legal obligation to address racial disparities within their systems, while well-intentioned
unitary school districts, acting in good faith, were not afforded the
same discretion necessary to implement and maintain policies that

" San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
86
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("[L]ocal autonomy has long
been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the educational process.").
87
See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 488 (1979) (Powell,]., dissenting)
(arguing that where racial imbalance is "beyond the reach of judicial correctio·n," local school
authorities should be encouraged to adopt voluntary measures to promote racial integration,
such as majority-to-minority transfer programs and magnet schools); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The administration and management of educational institutions are beyond the competence of judges and are within the special competence of educators, provided always that the
educators perform within legal and constitutional bounds."); Milliken, 418 U.S. at 743-44
("[T]he District Court will become first, a de facto 'legislative authority' to resolve these complex
questions, and then the 'school superintendent' for the entire area. This is a task which few, if
any, judges are qualified to perform ... [allowing courts to play such a role] would deprive the
people of control of schools through their elected representatives.").
88
Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995) (permitting a finding of unitary status despite
considerable racial disparities in educational achievement based on the conclusion that the disparities were not a result of past dejure segregation); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 476 (permitting lower
court to find partial unitary status on issue of student assignment even though there was continued racial isolation in the district's schools based on a finding that the segregation was not
the result of school district's de jure history but instead of individual, private housing choices);
Dowel~ 498 U.S. at 242 (permitting dissolution of court order even though new student assignment plan would result in an immediate return to segregation).
89
418 U.S. at 740-45.
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would prevent a return to the kinds of racially isolated conditions
that first led the Supreme Court to reach its conclusion in Brown. 90
The Court's jurisprudence also indicates approval of school
boards that might choose to establish student assignment policies designed to achieve racial integration for educational reasons independent of any constitutional obligation to do so. The first signal of
this nature came in Swann. There, a unanimous Court established
busing as one among many remedies that courts could order when
school boards refused or failed to meet their affirmative obligations
91
under Brown and Green.
However, it also expressed the view that
even though federal courts may be limited by the principle that "the
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy," 92 school
boards possess far greater discretion in assigning students in ways that
would achieve racial integration for pedagogical reasons:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement education policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational
policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the
93
authority of a federal court.
94

In North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, a companion
case to Swann, the Court again reiterated its position that school
boards have broad latitude in determining how to assign students:
"[A]s a matter of educational policy school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable
quite apart from any constitutional requirements." 95
Although federal courts may be constrained in their ability and
authority to order desegregation remedies, the Supreme Court has
always suggested that state and local officials could go further on
their own in trying to alleviate de facto segregation and achieve racial

90

See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort I), 263 F. Supp. 2d 209, 254 (D. Mass. 2003)
(noting willingness of most courts to defer to local decision-making of school boards in de jure
remedial cases in "determinations that unitary status has been achieved" and rationalizing that
it would be "only logical to afford at least as much deference to a school board that voluntarily
undertakes desegregation efforts"); id. at 254 ("There are good reasons to give deference to
school boards' attendance to the details of their student assignments and determinations of
whether race-neutral alternatives are adequate. They are the experts in what will or will not
work because they are uniquely attuned to the needs of a diverse urban community.").
91
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. l, 25 (1971).
92
Id. at 16.
" Id. (emphasis added).
04
402 U.S. 43 (1971).
95
Id. at 45; see also McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1971) (allowing a school board
considerable deference in the desegregation process).
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96

integration in their schools.
Not surprisingly, numerous lower
courts have read the Court's pronouncements on this score to mean
that focal voluntary efforts are not only constitutionally permissible,
97
but encouraged. Such principles are completely incongruous with
the ap~lication of strict scrutiny, which is reserved for disfavored be8
havior.
In the more than three decades since the Swann cases were decided, the Court has never issued an opinion contradicting the notion that state and local school officials could go further than federal
99
courts in their efforts to foster racially integrated student bodies.
And, in interpreting this line of language, federal district and appellate courts have repeatedly held that local and state authorities may
voluntarily use race-conscious student assignment policies to inte100
grate their schools and eliminate racial isolation.
The Sixth Circuit
96
See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (recognizing that school authorities have broad power unless
there is a constitutional violation); Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions Programs in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940, 948 (1999) (stating that in
Swann, the Court recognized that a school may implement a plan the Court did not have the
authority to order); see also Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir.
2000) ("The absence of a duty [to desegregate] sheds little light on the constitutionality of a
voluntary attempt.").
'; See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 750 (citing Swann as allowing voluntary integration efforts); Johnson v. Board of Education, 604 F.2d 504, 517 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 915 (1982) (recognizing that race must be considered when schools remedy
segregation).
98
See generally Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (arguing that the Warren Court's
new equal protection standard routinely utilized strict scrutiny to invalidate statutes). Recent
decisions by the Court have confirmed the "fatality" of strict scrutiny in the context of affirmative action policies designed to remedy past discrimination. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.]. A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a subcontractor hiring plan featuring a quota
for minorities, absent proof of past discrimination); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (striking down university affirmative action policy); Angelo
N. Ancheta, Contextual Strict Scrutiny and Race-Conscious Policy Making, 36 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 21
(2004) (observing that the Supreme Court's application of strict scrutiny invalidates most racial
classifications).
" In fact, lower federal courts have continued to embrace the principle. See Brewer, 212 F.3d
at 752 ("The absence of a duty [to desegregate) sheds little light on the constitutionality of a
voluntary attempt."); Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 379-80
(W.D. Ky. 2000) (recognizing the historical, moral, practical, and logical basis for affording
school boards the authority to pursue integration as a goal).
00
'
See, e.g., Brewer, 212 F.3d at 751 ("[L]ocal school authorities have the power to voluntarily
remedy de facto segregation existing in schools and, indeed, such integration serves important
societal functions"); Parent A.ss'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574, 581
n.9 (2d Cir. 1984) (indicating that a school board may take otherwise "constitutionally suspect
measures to counteract the perceived problem of accelerated white flight"); Clark v. Bd. of
Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 271 (8th Cir. 1983) ("Although the possibility of white flight and consequent resegregation cannot justify a school board's failure to comply with a court order to end
segregation, it may be taken into account in an attempt to promote integration.") (citation
omitted); Johnson, 604 F.2d at 518 ("[T]he absence of a constitutional duty on the part of the
school authorities to establish racially-based enrollments does not preclude the Board from pre-
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Court of Appeals in particular has spoken on the matter in fairly clear
terms:
Although boards of education have no constitutional obligation to relieve against racial imbalance which they did not cause or create, it has
been held that it is not unconstitutional for them to consider racial factors and take steps to relieve racial imbalance if it is in their sound judgment such action is the best method of avoiding educational harm.
In dealing with the multitude of local situations that must be considered and the even greater number of individual students involved, we believe it is the wiser course to allow for the flexibility, imagination, and
creativity of local school boards in providing for equal opportunity in
education for all students. It would be a mistake for the courts to read
Brown in such a way as to impose one particular concept of educational
administration as the only permissible method of insuring equality consistent with sound educational practice. We are of the view that there
may be a variety of permissible means to the goal of equal opportunity,
and that room for reasonable men of good will to solve these complex
101
community problems must be preserved.

The highest courts of several states have also reached the same
conclusion, holding that some level of race-consciousness and/ or reduction of racial isolation is necessary to satisfy the education provi-

scribing a racial balance to remedy the segregative impact of demographic change.") (emphasis
omitted); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort I), 263 F. Supp. 2d 209, 271 (D. Mass. 2003)
("To say that school officials in the K-12 grades, acting in good faith, cannot take steps to remedy the extraordinary problems of de facto segregation and promote multiracial learning, is to
go further than ever before to disappoint the promise of Brown."); Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 2001) ("[W]hile courts
are limited in their powers to impose desegregation measures, and may do so only to remedy
those constitutional violations arising from a state actor's de Jure segregation, school boards may
exercise a wider latitude in voluntarily adopting desegregation measures."); Willan v. Menomonee Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416, 1422 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("It is well-settled in federal law
that state and local school authorities may voluntarily adopt plans to promote integration even
in the absence of a specific finding of past discrimination."); Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F.
Supp. 129, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The tenor of these and related decisions ... clearly indicates
that the Fourteenth Amendment, while prohibiting any form of invidious discrimination, does
not bar cognizance of race in a proper effort to eliminate racial imbalance in a school system.")
(internal citations omitted).
101
Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55, 61 (6th Cir. 1966) (internal citations omitted); see also Jacobson v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1992) ("This authority [afforded to local school officials] includes the power to prescribe a ratio of white to
minority students that reflects the composition of the overall school district, particularly when
such a policy is implemented in order to prepare students for life in a pluralistic society.");
Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379 ("If [the school board] voluntarily chooses to maintain desegregated schools, it acts with the traditional authority invested in a democratically elected school
board .... ").
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sions of their state constitutions and concluding that the Federal
102
Constitution is no obstacle.
While the Supreme Court was in the midst of determining the parameters of permissible remedies in the context of school desegregation, a separate but related set of legal challenges began to surface.
Beginning in the late 1970s, a handful of cases worked their way up to
the Supreme Court in which parties sought guidance on the applicable constitutional standards for various voluntarily adopted, raceconscious efforts by state legislatures and public institutions to provide increased oproortunities to certain groups in employment and
higher education. 03 Unlike traditional racial discrimination cases
104
with which the Court had become familiar, these policies-now collectively known as "affirmative action" policies-were not intended to
subordinate racial minorities. Rather, they were designed to compensate the victims of systemic legal and economic exclusion resulting from our nation's long, tragic history of slavery, Jim Crow segre105
gation, and racial discrimination.
Within the span of a decade, the
Supreme Court had issued opinions on these cases in a variety of ar106
eas, ranging from public employment, to university and graduate

102
See, e.g., Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380 (1978) (upholding the Califcrnia Supreme Court's use of the California Constitution to require race-conscious desegregation);
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976) (obligating the school boards to alleviate de
jure and de facto racial segregation in public schools); Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn.
1996) (imposing a duty on the state to affirmatively remedy dejure and de facto racial segregation in public schools); Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 495 P.2d 657 (Wash.
1972) (allowing the school's mandatory busing scheme); Morean v. Bd. of Educ., 200 A.2d 97
(NJ. 1964) (permitting schools to take into account racial imbalance when assigning students
to schools).
·
103
See, e.g., Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating a school's layoff
scheme that favored minority teachers); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding
a federal scheme setting aside at least ten percent of the funding to minority businesses); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (ruling that racial quotas for medical
school admissions are unconstitutional, though schools may consider race as a factor in the
admission process).
104
See, e.g., Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding constitutional the local authority's use of zoning law to deny developer's plan to build racially integrated housing); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (ruling that the police department's recruiting test is not discriminatory, though it has a disproportionate impact on
African American applicants).
105
See F. Michael Higginbotham, Affinnative Action in the United States and South Africa, 13
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 187 (1999) (discussing affirmative action from a comparative standpoint); Nina Farber, Comment, justifYing Aifinnative Action After City of Richmond v.]. A. Croson: The Court Needs a Standard for Proving Past Discrimination, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 975, 978 ( 1990)
(defining an affirmative action plan as one giving disadvantaged groups a competitive edge).
106
See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (challenging a promotion policy,
favoring black candidates, allegedly justified by the employer's history of racial discrimination);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267 (challenging a shield law protecting minority teachers from certain
budget-induced layoffs).
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· •
107
. IOB
sc h oo l a d m1ss1ons, to government contracting.
The Court's modern formulation and understanding of the strict
scrutiny analysis ultimately emerged out of this context. In Croson, a
five:Justice majority of the Court resolved confusion over the constitutional standard to apply in these cases, holding that all state and local policies that provide a "racial preference," regardless of their motivation, must promote a "compelling governmental interest" and be
"narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest. 109 Several years later, in
Adarand, the Court extended the application of the strict scrutiny test
announced in Croson to federal hiring programs that establish racial
110
classifications.
Since then, federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, have widely employed this two-pronged approach to analyze
all forms of race-conscious, affirmative action preferences-most re111
cently and notably in Gratz and Grutter.
These two paths of equal protection jurisprudence rarely overlapped in any meaningful sense, maintaining distinct treatment by
the Supreme Court. In the early years of post-Brown school desegregation, the Court made firm, broad pronouncements about the kinds
of actions federal courts were required to take when school districts
failed on their own to cure the constitutional harms they had inflicted.112 Never once in these cases did the Court mention a need to
balance those remedies with any equal protection "right" of white
113
children to be free from integrative student assignments.
On the
'°' See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (challenging an admissions policy with racial quotas); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 420 U.S. 144 (1977) (challenging a race-conscious admissions policy in a law
school).
108
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (challenging federal policies affording preference to minority-owned businesses); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989) (challenging a set-aside city contracting provision for minority-owned businesses); Fulliluue, 448 U.S. at 448 (challenging the use of racial and ethnic criteria in the award
offederal grants).
'"" 488 U.S. at 493.
110
SeeAdarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that the Constitution
protects persons, not particular racial groups; hence, remedial racial classifications are not
treated favorably).
111
See also Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the two-prong test to a school program that denied transfer of a student from one school to
another based on race); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D.
Ky. 2004) (applying the two-prong test to a race-conscious school assignment plan); Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003) (applying the two-prong test
to a school desegregation plan).
112
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (stating that federal courts are authorized to order broad-reaching remedies where school officials have refused
to do so on their own); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (identifying various
aspects of the public school system from which vestiges of prior segregation must be eliminated).
"' Even though the Supreme Court's rulings in the school desegregation context were made
primarily in response to a finding of a constitutional liability, the way in which the Court spoke
of remedies to that violation is nonetheless instructive.
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contrary, since Brown, the Supreme Court's language has indicated
an acknowledgment that steps taken to achieve racial integration are
114
beneficial to all students, regardless of their race.
Furthermore, the
Court has never recognized an "injury" to students who may oppose
their integrative school assignments, and thus has never definitely
applied strict scrutiny in the context of school desegregation or voluntary school integration.
Even in the mid- to late 1970s, as the Court began to question the
scope of some of the desegregation remedies ordered by lower
115
courts, its concerns were expressed almost exclusively in terms of
constraints on federal judicial authority, not in terms of any fear of
trampling on the supposed rights of students who wish to be assigned
to a specific school of their choice or to schools closer to their
116
homes.
And, significantly, the Court's affirmative action rationale
did not appear anywhere of note in its trilogy of school desegregation
cases of the 1990s. Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins made much of the
deference that courts should afford to school districts in evaluating
117
their request for unitary status, but said nothing of constitutional
burdens that continued court supervision or enforcement of desegregation might impose upon "innocent" third parties despite the fact
that, during these same years, the Court was hearing the kinds of
cases out of which strict scrutiny review emerged.
The Supreme Court's affirmative action cases and school desegregation cases not only have separate origins and express different constitutional concerns, but they also appear to have avoided jurisprudential collision.
Despite their simultaneous emergence and
development, strict scrutiny has never been apglied in the context of
1
school desegregation by the Supreme Court.
Quite the contrary,

'" See, e.g., Estes v. Metro. Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 451 (1980) (stating that
all students benefit from attending racially diverse schools); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 485 n.5 (1979) (Powell,]., dissenting) (arguing that diverse schools teach students
to live harmoniously with people of other races).
115
See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976) (stating that federally
granted injunctions must first be obeyed before one can challenge the federal court's authority); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (stating that federal courts can only remedy
school plans when there is a constitutional violation).
116
Cf Bustop, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 1380, 1383 (1978) (Rehnquist,].) ("While I have
the gravest doubts that the Supreme Court of California was required by the United States Constitution to take the action that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that Constitution to take such action.")
111
See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 84.
11
'
Several other commentators have made this observation as well. See Kevin Brown, The
Constitutionality of Racial Classifications in Public School Admissions, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 7 (2000)
("The Supreme Court has not directly confronted the questions of whether and to what extent
public schools can take account of race and ethnicity to foster an integrated student body in a
context lacking an allegation of de jure segregation."); Wendy Parker, What School Desegregation
Teaches Affirmative Action 48 (Wake Forest U. Pub. Law Research Paper Series, Research Paper
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the Court, when presented with a chance to do so in Washington v. Se119
attl,e School District, No. J, elected to pass on the opportunity to
equate non-remedial, race-conscious student assignment policies to
typical race-preferential affirmative action. Indeed, it even went so
120
far as to strike down efforts at the state level to ban their adoption.
At issue in Washington was whether the voters of Washington
could, by popular initiative, ban all school districts in the state from
using busing as one method to alleviate de facto racial segregation in
121
their schools.
In November 1978, Washington voters enacted Initiative 350, a measure that essentially permitted the use of transportation in student assignment for every conceivable educational purpose
except for racial integration. 122 Applying the principle it first established in Hunter v. Erickson, 123 the Court concluded that the initiative
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because
the community's political mechanisms are modified to place effective decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different level of government. In a very obvious sense, the initiative thus "disadvantages those
who would benefit from laws barring" de facto segregation "as against
those who ... would otherwise regulate" student assignment decisions;
124
"the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority."

Although not directly confronted with the question of the consti125
tutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment, the Supreme Court nonetheless proceeded to opine about the values of inNo. 03-13, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=439141 ("Remarkably, school desegregation opinions rarely mention whether a compelling governmental interest exists and whether
the remedy is narrowly tailored to that interest. Instead, the courts recognize the importance of
local control and have been incredibly deferential to the defendants' requests.").
119
458 U.S. 457 (1982) (striking down a state-wide initiative prohibiting busing for desegregation on equal protection grounds).
120
Id. at 470-73.
121
The Court framed the question as follows: "[W]hether an elected local school board may
use the Fourteenth Amendment to defend its program of busing for integration from attack by
the State." Id. at 459.
1
The initiative required all students to be assigned to the school geographically closest to
"
them, but then proceeded to set out numerous broad exceptions to the general rule for virtually every educational purpose except school integration. Id. at 462-63 (citing WASH. REV.
CODE§ 28A.26.010 (1981) and describing its applicability). The initiative allowed an exception
for desegregation plans that were part of a court-ordered remedy. It was therefore understood
to apply only to voluntarily enacted school integration plans, but that fact did not save it from
its fate. Id. Interestingly, Initiative 350 banned voluntarily-enacted mandatory student assignment, which is often perceived as being more intrusive than are voluntarily-enacted, voluntary
forms of student assignment. Apparently, even the initiative at issue in Washington would have
permitted voluntarily enacted voluntary student assignment-that is, the sort of assignment system most school districts that practice voluntary school integration employ today. Id. at 469
n.13 & 473 n.16.
m 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (allowing local authorities to prevent racial discriminations in housing without a majority of votes from local voters).
124
Washington, 458 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (footnote omitted)).
125
Id. at 472 n.15.
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tegration and the important role that local communities can play in
fostering interracial interaction among their students-regardless of
any constitutional obligation to do so:
Education has come to be "a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment." When that environment is largely shaped by members of different racial and cultural
groups, minority children can achieve their full measure of success only if
they learn to function in-and are fully accepted by-the larger commupity. Attending an ethnically diverse school may help accomplish this
goal by preparing minority children "for citizenship in our pluralistic society," while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial majority "to
live in harmony and mutual respect" with children of minority heritage ....
It is undeniable that busing for integration-particularly when ordered
fry a federal court-now engenders considerably more controversy than
does the sort of fair housing ordinance debated in Hunter [ v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969)] .... But in the absence of a constitutional violation, the
desirability and efficacy of school desegregation are matters to be resolved through
126
.. l
th e po lztzca process.

The Court also cited with approval the decision of a threejudge
127
panel in Lee v. Nyquist, a case involving a threejudge district court
128
decision, which it affirmed without opinion.
In Lee, as in Washington, the court dealt with a state measure that barred local school officials from assigning students to attend a school for the purpose of ra129
In the process of invalidating that state law under
cial integration.
the Hunter doctrine, the court recognized that
[a] !though there may be no constitutional duty to undo de facto segregation, ... it is by now well documented and widely recognized by educational authorities that the elimination of racial isolation in the schools
promotes the attainment of equal educational opportunity and is benefi130
cial to all students, both black and white.

The Washington and Lee decisions are the closest the Supreme
Court has come to confronting the constitutionality of voluntary
school integration, and further demonstrate that the Court neither
viewed nor analyzed the development of its affirmative action jurisprudence in conjunction with its school desegregationjurisprudence.
Significantly, Washington was decided four years after a splintered
Court confronted the affirmative action policy in Bakke, and yet the

126

Id. at 472-74 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), summarily a!fd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
"' See Washington, 458 U.S. at 469-70 (citing Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 710).
129
Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 712; see also Washington, 458 U.S. at 469 (calling the facts of Lee "strikingly similar to the one[s] now before us").
130
Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 713.
1
"
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ma~ority opinion in Washington hardly makes mention of Bakke at
31
all.
Instead, both Washington and Lee contain repeated references
to the Court's mandate and vision in Brown and the important role
~at.}ocal sc?oo~ ?fficials and the political process ca? pl,~¥ in balancmg the desirab1hty and efficacy of school desegregation. · 2

Ill. THE APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL STRICT SCRUTINY TO
INTEGRATION PROGRAMS MAKES LITTLE ANALYTICAL SENSE

A. Different Context and Framework

The central problem with applying strict scrutiny to K-12 student
assignment programs is similar to the problems Justice Marshall
raised with the early developments of the strict scrutiny standard.
During the Court's struggles to determine the appropriate standard
of review for affirmative action programs and education, Justice Marshall repeatedly voiced his concerns about a rigid approach to equal
133
protection analysis. According to Justice Marshall,
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn .... [T]hat is, an approach in which "concentration [is] placed
upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmen-

'" The majority opinion in Washington references Bakke only when stating that the Court will
not pass on the issue of the propriety of the use of race in student assignments because the
practice was not challenged in the instant litigation. 458 U.S. at 472 n.15.
'" Id. at 474; see Lee, 318 F. Supp. at 717 (observing that elected boards have the power to
take measures to achieve racial equality).
"' See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(explaining the Court's rampant inconsistency in affirmative action jurisprudence); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518 (1980) (Marshall,]., concurring) (differentiating between pernicious and beneficial discrimination for purposes of the standard of review); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Marshall,].) (arguing for a lesser standard of
review for racial classifications incumbent to affirmative action programs); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall,]., dissenting) (arguing for strict scrutiny of an allegedly racially discriminatory Texas system for using property tax to supplement
educational funding); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (Marshall,]., dissenting) (reaffirming his dissatisfaction with application of the rational basis test based on the character
rather than the effects of legislation); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Marshall,].,
dissenting) (arguing against hypothesizing state goals under the rational basis test instead of
looking to the actual goal).
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tal benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in
.
134
support o f t h e cIass1"fi1cat1on.

The most important fact is that all integrative student assignments
are achieved through voluntary choices by children seeking to attend
a school other than their neighborhood school, with all children re135
taining the right to attend their neighborhood school.
In the final
analysis, every student, regardless of race, is assigned a school within
the district, all of which are "equal" in that they provide the same resources, are held to the same standards, teach the same curriculum
and employ the same policies. This approach to achieving integration is itself minimally intrusive. It is in error to believe that in the
absence of the use of race, there would be unmitigated school choice.
Another problem with the application of the Grutter analysis to
elementary and secondary school assignment plans is that the courts
view K through 12 educational decisions through the lens of affirmative action rather than public school integration. Thinking of enrollment in public schools in terms of "denial" instead of "assignment" invites an unnatural analogy to the selective admissions
policies of colleges and universities. In its affirmative action decisions, the Supreme Court faced applicants, candidates or contractors
who competed for positions, promotions or public contracts that
were typically finite in number or unique in kind, involving consid136
erations of merit or cost.
At issue in these cases, according to the
Court, are what are often called "zero-sum games," with so-called
137
"winners" and "losers."
Courts have stated that the resulting "injury" is the denial, based in some part on race, of a legally cognizable
benefit in the form of some limited good to which the complaining
138
party may have otherwise been entitled.
This basis does not extend to the context of public school student
assignment. There, the analysis must begin with the premise that

'"' Rndriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
'" See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334-35, 348 (D. Mass.
2003) (upholding a plan allowing parents and children to voluntarily balance race in schools);
Mead, supra note 21, at 125-26 (arguing that parents and children should be able to voluntarily
select a school in order to achieve racial balance).
,,. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205-10 (1995) (challenging racebased presumptions used in contractor compensation clauses); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78, 493-94 (1989) (striking down a plan giving contractors an incentive
to use minority businesses); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (using race as a factor in determining police department promotions); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269-70 (granting racial
preferences to minority employees when determining layoffs).
'" Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 369 (2003).
"" See Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 380 (W.D. Ky. 2000)
("The workplace, marketplace, and higher education cases are poor models for most elementary and secondary public school education precisely because they always involve vertical
choices-one person is hired, promoted, receives a valuable contract, or gains admission.").
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students have no right to attend a particular public school and that
139
every child will have the opportunity to go to school.
Until fairly
recently, the American system of public education afforded students
no opportunity to choose where to go to school; they simgly attended
1
the facility to which school authorities assigned them.
The only
clearly established constitutional requirement in such assignment de141
cisions is that students not be segregated by race.
Otherwise, all
students who reside within a district can be and are assigned to one of
the schools within the system; in a public school system, no student is
"denied" an assignment. In the limited instances where school districts elect to afford some degree of choice in assignment, typically
there are no determinations of merit or qualifications to attend a particular school, even though some schools may turn out to be more
142
popular among students than others.
This distinction is also of importance in a system where assignment decisions balance numerous objectives, but do not take into accou~t test s_cores, gr~des, essays or any other i:natters relati~2 to a s_tudent s ment or entitlement to attend a particular school. · Unhke
higher education or even selective secondary schools, school boards
with race-conscious student assignment plans do not get involved in
weighing comparative criteria in a competitive manner. Rather than
excluding applicants, the goal of integrative programs is to create a
more equitable school community for the education of all of its students.144 This does not require a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of individual students. For example, while the integration

1

'" See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 604 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 449 U.S. 915, 457 U.S. 52 (1982) ("Federal and state courts have uniformly rejected the contention of a constitutional right to attend a particular school.") (citations omitted).
0
"
See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White,]., concurring) ("[S]chool
boards customarily ... designate the school that particular students may attend ... .");Johnson,
604 F.2d at 515 (ruling that students do not have a constitutional right to attend a particular
school); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort/), 263 F. Supp. 2d 209, 257-58 (D. Mass. 2003)
("Nothing compels a school district to allow parents to choose their child's school. There is no
entitlement to attendance at a given school .... ").
141
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (establishing that racial segregation is
a violation of the Constitution).
1
See Comfort /, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (requiring no qualifications to attend any schools
"
within the district). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315 (requiring, as a prerequisite to admission in
a selective law school, grades, standardized tests, essays and other factors); Wessman v. Gittens,
160 F.3d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1998) (requiring an examination score for admission to a selective
high school).
1
"
See Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379 (stating that only race matters in the assignment
process examined).
1
"' See, e.g., Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 2000) (identifying one of the integration program's goals as "encouraging intercultural learning"); Comfort
v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333--35 (D. Mass. 2003) (stating that the
plan furthered the goal of preparing students for a multiracial nation).
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plan in Comfort seeks to foster interracial tolerance and understanding by permitting and encouraging students to make voluntary integrative transfers among its schools, the ability to take advantage of
such transfers does not hinge upon any determination of qualifica145
tion or merit.
Further, all students, regardless of race, may seek integrative transfers under the plan. Thus, absent in this context are
the kinds of concerns raised in affirmative action cases about the
permissibility of preferences or favoritism in a competitive process.
Conflating the unique goals and interests of a public school system and higher education also impacts the application of the narrow
tailoring component of the strict scrutiny analysis. The Bakke and
Grutter approaches to narrow tailoring do not translate mechanically
to the pre-collegiate levels of public education. The Bak~type diversity, also at issue in Grutter, is an expressive "diversity of viewpoints"
predicated on the notion that people of different backgrounds will
146
make unique contributions to academic discourse.
This type of diversity "encompasses a far broader array of qualifications ... of which
147
racial and ethnic origin is but a single though important element."
However, desegregation in the K-12 context is not based on "genuine" or view point diversity discussed in Grutter, but a commitment to
148
racial and ethnic diversity.
The diversity interest pushed by school
boards seeking racial integration does not rely on any assumptions
about any group's or individual's unique contribution, but reflects a
concern that elementary and secondary school children get used to
149
being in a classroom with people of different races and ethnicities.
Reading the United States Constitution to require consideration
of race only as a "plus" factor, for example, in addition to other
things such as sex, socio-economic background, family background,
or life experiences would only be a more convoluted way to achieve
racial integration and would impose fundamentally different educa-

145

Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315, and Wessman, 160 F.3d at 791, with Comfort v. Lynn Sch.
Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (the former cases involve merit-based admission
policies, contrary to that in Comfort II).
146
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 321
(1978) (stressing how essential diversity is to higher education).
'" Wessman, 160 F.3d at 798.
'" See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort Ill}, 418 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that
racial diversity can be a valid objective, and the school need not prove viewpoint diversity);
Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627-28 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (school
program prohibiting non-minority students from transferring out of city schools to suburban
schools, when the same opportunity is available to minorities).
149
See Brewer, 212 F.3d at 742 (observing that the school program's main goal is to reduce
minority isolation); Comfort II, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 333--35 (arguing that allowing students to
learn in a racially diverse environment promotes racial harmony in the society); Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 100 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 n.12 (D. Mass. 2000) (expressing a concern with the
racial diversity of the school, not viewpoint diversity).
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tional goals on the school systems, turning student assignment policies into a mini-college admissions process. Courts should not force
this outcome on schools because schools want to educate students in
a racially integrated setting. In this context, where racial integration
rather than "genuine diversity" is the goal, common sense says that
the narrowest way to achieve that goal is to use race itself. Moreover,
whatever the benefits that might be derived by adding these characteristics to the considerations for student assignment, doing so would
not promote racial integration. For instance, making allowances for
white children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds may
only worsen the segregation. If the goal identified is one of racially
integrated schools, the addition of more white children in an already
predominantly white school (or more minority children in an already
predominantly minority school) would merely increase the levels of
isolation regardless of the unique talents or socioeconom.ic status of
the newly admitted students. The distinct benefits of racial integration are gained through racial interaction. 1so If one of the goals is to
block the formation of stereotypes and racist attitudes, the most effective route is to promote multiracial interaction with exclusively
1
race-based assignment processes. 1s Theoretical discussions about racial tolerance are insufficient to effect change without meaningful
contact with students of different races.
B. Strict Scrutiny Is Not Automatically Applied in All Other Contexts Where
Race Is Considered

Despite its seemingly definitive language in Adarand, the Supreme
Court has not automatically applied strict scrutiny to all governmental uses of race, influenced, in part, by the tradition of deference af1
forded to the governmental entity or the nature of the legislation. s2
The application of strict scrutiny in the context of voluntary integra150

See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852-54 (W.D. Ky. 2004)
(observing that racial integration leads to an "appreciation of our diverse heritage").
151
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 (Parents Involved JI), 426 F.3d
1162, 1191 (9th Cir. 2005) ("When racial diversity is a principal element of the school district's
compelling interest, then a narrowly tailored plan may explicitly take race into account.")
(footnote omitted); Comfort III, 418 F.3d at 18 (stating that when racial diversity is the compelling interest and goal, "[t]he only relevant criterion, then, is a student's race ... ."); Brewer, 212
F.3d at 752 ("If reducing racial isolation is-standing alone-a constitutionally permissible
goal ... then there is no more effective means of achieving that goal than to base decisions on
race."); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding
the use of race in a laboratory school where the goal was obtaining a racially balanced research
sample).
152
This is true in the context of schools, prisons, and electoral redistricting. In addition, because of the history of political relations between the federal government and Native Americans, strict scrutiny has not been evoked for classifications based on Native American ancestry.
Ancheta, supra note 98, at 26.
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tion programs would involve the Court in the unnecessary and artificial task of judging the extent to which a school board's consideration of race, in isolation from the truly complex web of motivations
and considerations that drive public school student assignment decisions, can be labeled "compelling." There are many educationallyrelated goals of which school boards may be conscious in the assignment of their students. Considering race in combination with other
interrelated aspects of the assignment mechanism may serve many of
these interests. Indeed, strict scrutiny involves the search for an overarching constitutionally compelling motive and an analysis of competing models with the goal of identifying an alternative procedure in
which race is absent or less weighted, even though that alternative
significantly impedes the realization of the many other goals of student assignment.
For this reason, the fact that a student choice plan takes race into
account should no more trigger classic strict scrutiny than the mere
consideration of race in electoral districting should trigger strict scrutiny. 153 In the realm of electoral redistricting, the Court has held that
the consideration of race in legislative redistricting does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny as "the theory of strict scrutiny [has]
yielded to the need for an electoral system that is equally open to
members of minority groups." 154 In Milkr, the Court held that legislatures must be given the leeway to consider race because racial considerations are necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act and
155
with constitutional mandates.
Moreover, legislative redistricting is
within the authority of legislatures and, therefore, "the legislatures
must have discretion to exercise the political judgment necessary to
balance competing interests and courts must exercise extraordinary

1
"

See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996) (explaining that strict scrutiny should not
be applied unless "traditional districting criteria [is] subordinated to race"); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 907 (1996) (same); Millerv.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (same); Shawv. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (same).
154

Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting
Cases, 43 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1569, 1603 (2002); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (indicating that
legislative enactments will be afforded a presumption of good faith unless a plaintiff proves that
the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations). Analyses in electoral redistricting cases rest in pan on the Voting Rights Act's and the
Fifteenth Amendment's requirement of the awareness and consideration of race in electoral
policies. While there are no parallel laws in the realm of public education, there are federal
statutory, state statutory and constitutional provisions to either maintain racially integrated
schools or to avoid programs that have a disparate impact on racial groups. Furthermore,
Brown requires a degree of racial awareness and action on the part of school boards. At issue in
Brown was the goal of eliminating separate schools identifiable by race. Elementary and secondary school integration programs are an evolution and steps towards realization of the Brown
principles.
155
See also Bush, 517 U.S. at 992 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (emphasizing that leeway should
be granted to states so they are not trapped between "competing hazards ofliability").
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caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines on
156
the basis of race."
Therefore, courts assessing a redistricting plan
"must be sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a leg157
islature's redistricting calculus."
Accordingly, strict scrutiny is not
applied unless race is the predominant factor in creating a legislative
158
And, not only must race
district; not just a factor in the decision.
predominate, but the plaintiff must also prove that "the legislature
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles" to racial
159
considerations.
Finally, the Court acknowledged that in seeking to
challenge electoral districts on the basis of race, the burden of proof
160
on plaintiffs is a "demanding one."
And, until the plaintiff meets
161
this burden, the good faith of the legislature must be presumed.
While the Supreme Court has not yet articulated another context
in which strict scrutiny will only be triggered if the use of race is
162
found to predominate the decision-making process, there are parallels between legislative redistricting and K-12 education that support
the conclusion that the adoption of race-conscious student assignment programs to eliminate segregation should not automatically
•
•
•
163
tngger stnct scrutmy.
School boards, like legislatures, must also comply with federal and
state constitutional and statutory requirements, many of which require school boards to maintain racially integrated schools or to
164
avoid programs that have a disparate impact on racial groups.
In
order to avoid violating these statutory and constitutional provisions,
some level of race-consciousness when addressing student assignments is necessary.

156

Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16) (internal citations omitted).
157
Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
158
Easley, 532 U.S. at 241 (reiterating the "predominant" factor requirement of Miller).
"' Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
160
Easley, 532 U.S. at 241 (citing Milkr, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor,J., concurring)).
161
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (describing the burden placed on plaintiffs in districting cases).
"' Ancheta, supra note 98, at 40. But see NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1021, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (describing a stipulated settlement allowing use of race or
ethnicity in student assignments provided that race or ethnicity "may not be the primary or predominant consideration in determining" student admission criteria).
1
See generally Karlan, supra note 154, at 1578 (recognizing how inevitable racial awareness is
"
to redistricting and admissions decisions).
1
"" See, e.g., Racial Imbalance Act, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (LexisNexis 2000) (directing the Board of Education to remedy de facto segregation in the public schools throughout
Massachusetts); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that racial segregation in
public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2001) (forbidding recipients of federal funds from utilizing "criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color or national origin").
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In redistricting, plaintiffs must establish that race predominated
·over race-neutral districting principles such as "compactness, contiguity and respect for political subdivisions or communities" in order for
165
strict scrutiny to apply.
Like redistricting, factors other than race
are considered when implementing student assignment plans. Indeed, other considerations, such as respecting the ability of children
to attend their neighborhood school and keeping siblings together,
are routinely given more weight than race in determining student assignment.166 Requiring the identification of a discrete state interest in
order to then scrutinize the policy for narrow tailoring fails to account for the realities of operating a K-12 educational system.
School boards do not deliberate on each of these considerations in a
167
vacuum or without practical limitations. Rather, they must also balance these goals with real world constraints such as budgetary allocations, finding ways to raise and distribute funds in a manner that reflects school equality and provides equity, and managing school
transfers to avoid the neglect of any schools in the district. With the
application of strict scrutiny, courts have evaluated the myriad of
complex pragmatic and educationally-related considerations the
school boards must weigh in developing their student assignment
policies and program and resource allocation initiatives for the purpose of isolating a single motivating factor that can be labeled "compelling" in isolation from other considerations school boards consider in crafting their student assignment programs. This approach
does not allow one to evaluate the plan as a whole, but forces focus
on the one aspect that uses race, ignoring that there is an essential
relationship between the race-conscious aspects of the plan and the
curricular and structural changes in achieving their goals. Without
the racial piece, the rest of the student assignment plan would fail to
accomplish the intended goal.
The concurring and dissenting opinions by five Justices in a recent Supreme Court decision further softens the Court's pronouncement in Adarand that all racial classifications must automati168
cally be subjected to strict scrutiny. In Johnson v. California, an
165

Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.

166

See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort Ill), 418 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing an assignment plan which emphasizes the ability of children to attend their neighborhood
school over racial considerations); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1
(Parents Involved I), 377 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that keeping siblings together plays larger role than race in student assignment plan).
167

See Comfort Ill, 418 F.3d at 8-9 (describing goals of the assignment program beyond racial
redistribution); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 (Parents Involved JI),
426 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that districts must balance desire to maintain
local control over desegregation plan, the needs of the students, and the needs of the school
district).
108
543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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African-American prisoner challenged the California Department of
Corrections' policy of separating prisoners in double cells by race for
up to sixty days each time a prisoner enters a new correctional facility
169
in order to avoid gang and racial violence.
In determining that
strict scrutiny should apply to assess the constitutionality of the policy,
the majority stated that a court must "apply strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
government is pursin?" a goal important enough to warrant use of a
17
highly suspect tool."
Despite this language in the majority opinion,
several Justices wrote separate opinions to support the general proposition that the use of race does not automatically trigger the application of strict scrutiny, particularly where the use of race is remedial or
where the governmental entity has historically been afforded substantial deference.
First, three Justices, Justice Ginsberg, Justice Breyer and Justice
Souter, joined the majority opinion in stating that the classification at
issue was "stereotypical" and warranted the application of strict scrutiny, 171 but filed a concurring opinion to state that "the same standard
of review ought not to control judicial inspection of every official ra172
cial classification." While the Justices agreed that "state-imposed racial segregation is highly suspect and cannot be justified on the
ground that 'all persons suffer the [separation] in equal degree,"' 173
they also clearly expressed the belief that "actions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated." 174
In dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that
temporary segregation in prisons should not be subject to strict scrutiny, essentially for three interrelated reasons. First, Justice Thomas
argued that strict scrutiny should not be applied because the Court
has recognized that "constitutional demands are diminished in the
·
.
" 175 Th omas asserte d t h at t h e case preumque
context o f pnsons.
sented the Court with the challenge of applying two conflicting lines
Id. at 502.
Id. at 506 (quoting City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality decision)).
171
Id. at 516.
"'Id.
"' Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ).
174
Id. (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003)); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 344-46 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing the ongoing problem of race
bias while concurring with the majority's opinion upholding a race-conscious law school admissions program); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 271-76 (1995) (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) (promoting deference to congressional attempts to confront the historically-based
problems of race).
"' Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541.
iw
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of precedent. The first line of precedent stems from Adarand's pronouncement that all racial classifications must be subjected to strict
176
scrutiny.
The second is the Court's clear statements that a "relaxed" standard of review "applies to all circumstances in which the
177
needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights."
Second, Thomas advised that the courts should defer to the ex178
perts on the "proper" administration of prisons.
Thomas cited to
several instances in which the Court acknowledged that "experienced
prison administrators, and not judges, are in the best position to su179
This
pervise the daily operations of prisons across this country."
philosophy has led the Court to use the relaxed standard of review
regardless of the standard that would apply outside of the prison con180
text. According to Thomas, such deference is necessary because:
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be subject
to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had
a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. Courts inevitably
would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution
to every administrative problem, thereby unnecessarily perpetuatin15 the
1
involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration.

Finally, Thomas argues that because the broad-sweeping language
in Adarand and other affirmative action cases only "addressed the
contention that classifications favoring rather than disfavoring blacks
are not exempt," California's "neutral" practice of cell assignment
where "no cells are designated for, nor any special privileges afforded
182
to, any racial group" should not be subjected to the same level of
scrutiny as uses of race that are not neutral. Thomas believes this
contention is further supported because race is only one factor
183
among many considered in housing decisions in California prisons.
Prison officials also take into account gang affiliation, geographic

176

Id. at 524.
Id. (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990)) (emphasis added by Justice
Thomas in dissenting opinion).
178
Id. at54L
179
Id. at 529 (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) and
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) ).
180
Id. at 530-31 (describing prior cases where prisoners' constitutional claims are not afforded the same standard of review as would apply outside of prison).
181
Id. at 531 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted)).
1
"
Id. at 535.
1
Id. at 535-36.
"
177
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origin, national origin, phJ:sical size, age, criminal history, mental
1 4
health, and medical needs.
Surprisingly, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion stands as a blueprint of why the automatic application of strict scrutiny to K-12 integration programs makes little analytical sense. First, as in the context
of prisons, there is a long history of school cases where the courts
have held that students have different constitutional rights in the
185
unique context of elementary and secondary education.
While
there are no constitutional rights implicated when a school district
considers race as one factor among many in assigning students to
80
generally interchangeable schools/ that line of cases is still enlightening as to the Court's historical treatment of the interests of public
school students. Second, there is a long line of precedent acknowledging that school administrators know better than courts what kind
of learning environment is best for children and, as a result, are af187
forded considerable deference by the courts.
Finally, unlike other
cases in which strict scrutiny is applied, there is no legally cognizable
privilege, benefit, or burden on a student being required to attend
his or her zoned neighborhood school. Thomas apparently agrees
that the absence of a "special privilege" should play a role in the constitutional analysis as to what standard courts apply. Coupled with the
long-acknowledged benefits of being educated in an integrated environment and the undeniable harms of being educated in a segregated environment, the Court should find the case even more compelling when the policy that is challenged is one of integration of
children rather than segregation of prisoners. Indeed, even the majority opinion in Johnson stands for the proposition that racial segregation is so abhorrent that great lengths must be taken to protect and
•
•
188
promote mtegrat1on.

C. A Different Level of Constitutional Scrutiny Applies in Elementary and
Secondary Schools

The Supreme Court has carved out certain arenas in which constitutional rights are balanced against the need for discretion of those

18<
1
"

Id.

See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
187
See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
188
See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509 ("The United States contends that racial integration actually
'leads to less violence in [prisons] and better prepares inmates for re-entry into society.'" (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636))).
186

662

JOURNAL OF CONS1TI'U710NAL LAW

[Vol.9:3

189

charged with running the institution.
In his dissenting opinion m
190
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, Justice Brennan stated that
[p)ublic education serves vital national interests in preparing the Nation's youth for life in our increasingly complex society and for the duties
of citizenship in our democratic Republic. The public school conveys to
our young the information and tools required not merely to survive in,
but to contribute to, civilized society. It also inculcates in tomorrow's
leaders the "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system .... "
The public educator's task is weighty and delicate indeed. It demands particularized and supremely subjective choices among diverse
curricula, moral values, and political stances to teach or inculcate in stu191
dents, and among various methodologies for doing so.

For these reasons, public elementary and secondary schools are
among those arenas. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
192
that the educational environment presents "special characteristics"
and, although elementary and secondary school students are entitled
to protection of their constitutional rights, those ri&hts are not afforded the same level of protection as those of adults. 3

189
See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 134&-59
(2000) (discussing five Court decisions addressing speech rights of elementary and secondary
school students).
190
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
191
Id. at 278 (Brennan,]., dissenting) (quoting Anlbach v. Notwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979))
(citations omitted); see also Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm. (Comfort II), 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 374
(D. Mass. 2003) ("Over and over again, courts have given school boards discretion to weigh the
constitutional rights of students against the unique demands of a public education setting and
curricular needs."); Brown, supra note 118, at 68-69 ("The Supreme Court's education jurisprudence makes it clear that the Court has interpreted constitutional rights in light of the special environment of public education. This general view of education has shifted the emphasis
in educational disputes 'from a rights-based to a values-based ideology.' Thus, the Court's determination of constitutional rights outside of the context of public education does not necessarily dictate their scope within the special environment of public education.") (footnote omitted) (quoting Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices of
Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 186 (1996)); Ryan, supra note 189, at 1338 ("[T)he Court
has characterized the government as acting in a special capacity-that of educator-and has
accordingly given education officials greater leeway to bend constitutional rights in order to
achieve certain educational goals.").
192
Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High School: Are College Students' Free Speech Rights the
Same as Those of High School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173, 196 (2003) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ).
1
"
See id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) ("A student's privacy interest
is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety."); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding that random drug testing of student athletes in public schools does not violate the Fourth or
Fourteenth Anlendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985) (upholding search of student's purse under the Fourteenth
Anlendment when there are reasonable grounds that the search will tum up evidence of infrac-
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94

In Hazelwood: the Court dealt with the censorship of a studentpublished high school newspaper to remove articles dealing with is195
sues of teen pregnancy and divorce.
Quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
196
Independent Community School District,
the Court reiterated that
"[s]tudents in the public schools do not 'shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate. ,,,191 H owever, t h e C ourt went on to state th at
[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control ... to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that
readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
198
are not erroneously attributed to the school.

The Court reasoned that if schools were not allowed to exercise
greater control over the speech of their students, "the schools would
be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as 'a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
199
to his environment. "'
It is only when the action taken has no valid
educational purpose that the First Amendment is so '"directly and
sharply implicate[d]' as to re~uire judicial intervention to protect
0
students' constitutional rights."
The principles announced in Hazelwood have guided the Court in
its assessment of the level of First Amendment protection to afford in
201
the educational environment.
Lower federal courts have followed
the Supreme Court's lead and have recognized that educators' decisions in:glicating the First Amendment are entitled to substantial deference.
tion); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools.").
194
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
195
Id. at 262-64.
196
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
197
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
198
Id. at 271.
199
Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ).
200
Id. at 273 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)) {citation omitted).
201
See, e.g., Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 291 (2000) (citing Hazelwood in
determining whether educator's actions offended free speech); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (same).
202
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Bd. of Ed. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that there is no violation in declining to rehire a journalism teacher on the basis that
the teacher violated a school policy requiring review of student submissions); Seyfried v.
Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981) (upholding a principal's decision to cancel a student musical because of its sexual theme); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (declaring
that school authorities can prohibit distribution of a sex questionnaire to high school freshmen
and sophomores, but not juniors and seniors); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (upholding the school's ability to seize student newspaper materials on the grounds that
the materials would create disorder and disruption).

664

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:3

Similarly, in the area of Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme
Court has held that "[s]ecuring order in the school environment
sometimes requires that students be subjected to greater controls
203
than those appropriate for adults."
In Board of Education v. Earls,
the Court reiterated that '"special needs' inhere in the public school
context. While schoolchildren do not shed their constitutional rights
when they enter the schoolhouse, 'Fourth Amendment rights ... are
204
different in public schools than elsewhere .... "'
Similar to that of
First Amendment rights, the privacy rights of a student must be balanced against "the substantial interest of teachers and administrators
in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds." 205
Therefore, the "school setting requires some easing of the restrictions
to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject" 206 and
the prohibition of activities that are stringently protected if commit207
ted outside of the educational environment.
The decisions in Hazelwood, Earls, Tinker and T.L. 0. evidence the
Court's understanding that the good faith decisions of educators
should be afforded deference and that educators must enjoy flexibility in crafting methods to achieve their educational goals, even in
208
light of constitutional protections.
These categories of opinions
rest on the general foundation that the standards of review of the
Court should "neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities
to maintain order in their schools nor authorize unrestrained intru209
sions upon the [rights] of schoolchildren."
The goals of educating
children in an integrated environment are no less compelling than
those the Court articulated to justify diminished First Amendment
and Fourth Amendment protection for students.
CONCLUSION

Federal courts should resist the request to import the strict scrutiny analysis from the affirmative action context and apply it to the
voluntary school integration context to limit the broad latitude that
school districts have traditionally enjoyed, and indeed need, in order
to make sensitive, well-informed, educational policy decisions. Not
203

Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002).
"" Id. at 829-30 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 656 (1995))
(citations omitted).
205
NewJerseyv. T.L.0., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
206
Id. at 340.
20
'
Id. at 339.
208
See Bernard James & Joanne E.K Larson, The Doctrine of Deference: Shifting Constitutional
Presumptions and the Supreme Court's R.estatement of Student Rights After Board of Education v. Earls,
56 S.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (2004) ("[C]ourts should defer to good faith decisions of local educators
that further the educational mission.").
209
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342-43.
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only would doing so run counter to the historical development of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, but it would make little sense from a
philosophical, analytical, and practical perspective. The qualitative
and analytical differences between affirmative action and voluntary
integration programs in the K-12 context, when viewed in conjunction with the distinct history and context out of which voluntary ·
school integration emerged, and the critical, practical impact of subjecting race-conscious policies to "the skeptical, questioning, beady210
eyed scrutiny" of strict scrutiny make it clear that strict scrutiny has
no place here. In the end, when a school district takes race into account for the purpose of integration in student assignment, there
simply is no legal injury; on the contrary, there is instead a universally
shared benefit for all students-namely, the opportunity to learn in a
racially integrated educational setting. The Court's decisions to apply
strict scrutiny do not afford school districts the discretion necessary to
implement and maintain policies that would prevent a return to the
kinds of racially isolated conditions that first garnered the attention
of those school boards. Rather, it empowers judges to make sensitive
pedagogical decisions best left to school boards and educational experts.

210

Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996).

